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The Politics of Receptivity and Resistance: How Brazil, 
India, China, and Russia Strategically use the International 
health Community in Response to HIV/AIDS: A Theory 
 
Eduardo J. Gómez 
 
 
Little is known about how emerging nations, such as Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (aka, B.R.I.C.), strategically use the international health community in 
order to strengthen their domestic HIV/AIDS programs. In this article, I 
introduce a new theoretical framework, strategic “receptivity” and “resistance,” 
in order to explain how and why this process occurs. Brazil emerges as the most 
successful case of how this process leads to the formation of international 
partnerships and domestic policies strengthening its AIDS program, with India 
gradually building such a response, followed by China and Russia. This article 
closes with an explanation of how this strategic interaction reflects the growing 
independence and influence of BRIC while highlighting how this framework 
applies to other cases.    
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As nations continue to confront the AIDS epidemic, little is known about how and 
why they strategically interact with the international health community in order 
to enhance their domestic responses. The international health community is 
defined as bilateral and multi-lateral agencies providing financial and technical 
assistance for AIDS, advice on HIV prevention, as well as the global market for 
pharmaceutical products. As the AIDS epidemic progresses and nations become 
better at responding to it, some have become more financial and technically 
independent from the international community. This is especially the case for 
emerging nations such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (B.R.I.C.), where sound 
economic performance and health system innovations have induced political 
elites to essentially break their dependence on the international community. 
 In this second phase of AIDS politics, emerging nations change the nature 
of their relationship with the international community. They become more 
strategic in their interaction with it, taking and in some instances giving back to 
it. While some nations still receive donor aid assistance, it is no longer a 
domineering factor shaping AIDS policy. Rather, aid is strategically used to 
sustain and enhance certain aspects of domestic programs. Thus, the running 
assumption in this paper is that interactions with the international community 
are used for domestic benefits. Nevertheless, even those nations having engaged 
in early and consistent partnerships with the donor community at times resist 
advice for AIDS prevention and treatment policy, as well as join international 
movements against the imposition of high prices for ARV.  
How and why does this kind of response to the international community 
occur? And why are some nations more strategic and successful than others? In 
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answering these questions, I submit a new theoretical framework and 
explanation. Specifically, I argue that nations often engage in simultaneous 
“receptivity” and “resistance” of the international community. Receptivity is 
defined as a nation’s partnership with donor agencies for the expansion of AIDS 
administration; these partnerships vary in their length and breadth, with the 
more successful cases having longer, well-established partnerships. They often 
take the form of loans and in some instances grants. Moreover, partnerships are 
solidified over a long period of time and lead to an expectation of continued 
support, even if domestic commitment levels eventually surpass donor 
assistance.  
Nevertheless, I argue that two conditions must be present for receptivity to 
occur: First, governing elites, acting autonomously from vested institutional 
interests, must be concerned about their reputation as nations capable of 
effectively responding to AIDS; Second, elites must be aware of their pre-existing 
history of international collaboration. When these conditions are present, elites 
have incentives to be receptive because this provides them with the resources 
needed to develop successful AIDS programs while further enhancing their 
reputation. In the end, I argue that reputation-building and historical precedents 
must be jointly present for receptivity to occur. 
 Receptivity provides the opportunity space for the emergence of another 
variable accounting for differences in outcomes: i.e., the emergence of tripartite 
partnerships between donors, AIDS officials, and NGOs. Here, AIDS officials 
have career incentives to forge close partnerships with donors and NGOs. This 
provides AIDS officials with career stability, which in turn inspires them to 
continuously work with donors and NGOs for the continued expansion of AIDS 
programs. The presence of a federal commission ensuring the representation of 
NGOs facilitates this process but by no means guarantees effectiveness. 
On the other hand, a nation’s resistance to the international community 
occurs when external recommendations for AIDS prevention and treatment, 
when combined with high prices for ARV medication, challenge a nation’s 
preexisting normative structure and belief in how it should respond. That is, 
when recommendations go against deeply ingrained moral views, or when they 
threaten a nation’s belief in universal access to healthcare as a form of human 
rights, nations will resist the international community.  
Furthermore, nations will resist the imposition of high market prices for 
ARV medication whenever normative commitments to universal healthcare 
combine with the pharmaceutical capacity to produce generic medication. 
Resistance may take the form of issuing compulsory licenses or issuing threats of 
doing so. Resistance occurs only when these two conditions are present; neither 
one on its own is sufficient for such a response. For example, even if nations have 
the pharmaceutical capacity to produce drugs, in the absence normative 
commitments to universal health care, they will refrain from resisting markets. 
This stems mainly from the fear of tarnishing their image as free trade partners; 
and this will occur despite their ability to easily resist markets, as outlined 
through the 2001 Doha declaration. 
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What all of this suggests is that emerging nations are willing to work with 
the international community as long as it does not threaten their pre-existing 
normative structure. What this further suggests is that emerging nations are keen 
on taking what they need from the international community while resisting other 
areas of recommendation and assistance. What this implies, and as I discuss at 
length in the conclusion, is emerging nations’ recognition that they are 
independent and important enough to risk this kind of strategic interaction with 
the international community. This further underscores their rising influence and 
power. 
 
STRATEGIC RECEPTIVITY AND RESISTANCE 
 
Because AIDS has been on the international agenda for quite some time, 
pressures from international agencies and NGOs generate incentives for 
politicians to respond more aggressively to the epidemic, while ensuring that they 
meet the needs of civil society. This is reinforced by new international norms and 
commitments advocating the full integration of civil society into the policy-
making process. 
During this period, emerging nations eager to respond to the needs of civil 
society will also begin to notice their differences with the international 
community. While nations may be receptive to establishing partnerships with 
donors, at the same time they may resist international recommendations 
challenging their approach to AIDS control. 
This leads to what I call strategic internationalization in AIDS politics. It is 
marked by a nation’s strategic usage of the international community for their 
domestic institutional and policy benefits: that is, being receptive to aid 
assistance while vehemently resisting recommendations for particular policy 
changes. 
Graph 1.1 – Radar Map of Receptivity 
         Tripartite Partnership/Program Expansion 
     
                        Historic Legacy        Reputation-Building 
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As Graph 1.1 here illustrates, receptivity to donor aid assistance is 
preconditioned by a nation’s incentives to increase its reputation. In an effort to 
show the world that they are effective modern states, elites wish to reveal that 
they have always been committed to working with other nations in response to 
disease; they wish to show that they have modern agencies, resources, and are 
equally as capable of responding to AIDS when compared to advanced 
industrialized states; moreover, they have incentives to show that they can even 
outpace them in their response. Responding to international criticisms is thus 
viewed as an opportunity to illustrate state strength and commitment to 
combating AIDS while safeguarding human rights. Consequently, nations are 
receptive to donor aid assistance because this provides the means through which 
to not only maintain but also to further enhance their reputation.  
Historic legacies also play an important role. Nations that have a long 
history of working with the international community will have an on-going legacy 
and commitment to do the same whenever a new epidemic emerges. Elite 
recollection of their nation’s close partnership with other nations through 
international organizations will motivate them to do the same at subsequent 
points in time.  
The end result of these two dynamics, reputation-building and historic 
legacies, is a nation’s receptivity to donor aid assistance. This often entails 
technical assistance to strengthen AIDS administration, such as funding for staff 
and for initiatives to work closely with the states and NGOs. 
 
Graph 1.2 – Radar Map of Rejection 
Compulsory License, Threat/Resist Prevention Recommendations 
 
Normative Structure            Pharmaceutical Capacity  
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Alternatively, resistance emerges when nations challenge bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral pressures for certain types of prevention and treatment policies. 
Nations resist when international recommendations go against domestic 
normative structures, such as beliefs about the causes and consequences of AIDS 
and how the government should respond. But they also resist when global prices 
for ARV medication challenge pre-existing commitments to universal healthcare. 
Thus, resistance entails two policy areas: AIDS prevention and access to 
medicine.  
Two sides of the normative sphere prompt resistance to prevention policy. 
On one hand, emerging nations with historic institutions, such as laws, upholding 
their moral beliefs will resist external advice challenging these beliefs – e.g., sex 
education and harm reduction. On the other hand, nations that do not 
institutionalize moral beliefs but rather their normative democratic commitment 
to human rights and universal access to medicine, solidified through 
democratization processes and constitutions, will adamantly resist international 
advice challenging these commitments. Nations will, for example, resist any 
donor aid conditionalities threatening their belief in human rights, such as 
providing assistance to sex workers, or donors arguing against the universal 
provision of ARV medication based on exorbitant costs to the economy. 
Next, when normative commitments to universal healthcare combine with 
the infrastructural capacity to produce generic drugs, the second resistance 
impulse emerges, that is, resistance to global markets. Nations differ in their 
historical experiences, commitments, and capacity to develop pharmaceutical 
labs for vaccine production. When present, strong pharmaceutical capacity can 
motivate elites to use their knowledge and resources as a way to challenge global 
market prices and ensure that they can afford the universal provision of ARV 
medication.1  
Resistance to global market yields the following responses: either impose 
compulsory licenses for generic medication or issue the threat to do so. When 
nations have strong infrastructural capacity and normative commitments to 
universal healthcare, threats of imposing compulsory licenses will be credible and 
will lead to a lower price for ARV medicine, thus ensuring access to it.  
Alternatively, nations may have strong pharmaceutical capacity but 
nevertheless fail to have normative commitments. In this scenario, nations may 
refrain from resisting markets and instead opt for price negotiations. For 
example, while the 2001 Doha declaration2 of the 1995 TRIPS3 agreement, as well 
as paragraph 6 of Doha in 2003,4 certainly provides ample opportunity for 
nations to resist markets through compulsory licensing, a nation’s concern about 
its reputation as a country committed to free trade may generate incentives not to 
do so.5 When this occurs, emerging nations will be more concerned about their 
trade reputation then they are with safeguarding the needs of civil society. 
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Consequently, instead of resisting markets, they will engage in price negotiations 
with pharmaceutical companies, even if they have the infrastructural prowess to 
challenge markets.  
But is there really a global market for ARV medication? The market in its 
purest form is certainly not present. Because of the contributions of bilateral 
agencies, such as PEPFAR, multilateral organizations such as the Global Fund, 
and philanthropic donors such as the Gates and Clinton foundation and their 
provision of ARV medicine to developing nations, markets no longer impose a 
serious constraint. Moreover, there is now an ethical norm that that these 
organizations should delude the market through the provision of ARV medicine.6  
These contributions notwithstanding, given the high costs associated with 
generic medication and the need for second-line drugs, assistance provided from 
the international community often falls short of meeting country needs. Domestic 
commitments to provide drugs through universal healthcare, limited fiscal 
(especially sub-national) constraints and the continued growth of AIDS cases 
requires that most nations still engage the global market; while it may no longer 
be as constraining, nations still find themselves in need of strategically working 
with it. How they respond to global markets reflects their ongoing domestic 
needs. And in cases where the international community’s help still falls short of 
meeting needs, they will strategically resist markets in order to ensure the 
provision of ARV medication. 
 
Tripartite Partnerships as a Receptivity Mechanism  
Despite this resistance, when receptivity occurs this leads to new coalitional 
strategies advancing administrative and policy reform. More specifically, these 
conditions lead to the emergence of new tripartite partnerships between AIDS 
officials, donors, and NGOs. The availability of donor aid stipulating the 
incorporation of NGOs into the policy-making process creates incentives for 
AIDS officials to accomplish two things: First, to strengthen partnerships with 
NGOs; and second, to strategically use these partnerships in order to increase 
their influence within government. Moreover, the goal for AIDS officials is not 
only to increase administration and policy spending, but also to advance their 
careers. By working closely with NGOs, AIDS officials can strategically use these 
networks to obtain more funding from international creditors while maintaining 
government support. Because of this, AIDS officials take the lead in forming and 
sustaining these partnerships. I argue that the formation of these partnerships is 
necessary for the continued expansion of an AIDS program. 
 
BRAZIL 
Soon after increased pressures and criticisms of Brazil’s delayed response to 
AIDS emerged, circa 1990,7 the president and senior health officials became 
increasingly concerned about the government’s reputation.8 By 1994, President 
Fernando H. Cardoso strove to increase Brazil’s reputation as a modern state 
capable of controlling AIDS.9 Cardoso recalled the long history that Brazil had of 
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eradicating disease, such as syphilis and TB.10 In essence, Cardoso viewed 
responding to AIDS as an opportunity to reveal Brazil’s effective healthcare 
system and technical expertise.11 Moreover, his views spread throughout the 
Ministry of Health. This changed the government’s perception of the AIDS 
problem and increased its interest in strengthening the AIDS program.12 
 Yet it is important to note that democratic institutions and electoral 
pressures did not instigate Cardoso’s response. In fact, during his 1994 
presidential campaign, Cardoso never mentioned the AIDS program.13 Congress 
certainly did not influence Cardoso’s decisions, while his health ministers were 
given complete autonomy and were isolated from external pressures.14   
 Concern about Brazil’s reputation increased under the current Luiz 
Ignácio Lula da Silva “Lula” administration. Soon after Lula’s arrival, he met with 
the director of the AIDS program, Dr. Paulo Teixeira, to see what they could do to 
increase Brazil’s reputation and policy influence.15 Noticing how the media was 
praising Brazil for its success, Lula went as far as to meet with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to see how they could market their AIDS program more 
effectively.16 Concern about the AIDS program’s reputation has motivated Lula to 
remain committed to it while working with other nations and donors in order to 
strengthen his and other nation’s response. 
 In addition to reputation-building, the government was also aware of the 
long history that it had of working with other nations to combat disease. In 
addition to sending teams of doctors to Europe to attend conferences in order to 
find a cure for syphilis, TB, and polio, Brazil was one of few nations to propose 
the creation of the World Health Organization in 1948. This history had a 
profound impact on President Cardoso’s interest in maintaining this tradition 
and working with international organizations in response to AIDS.17 This 
knowledge and legacy permeated the Lula administration, moreover, and 
motivated his senior AIDS officials to work closer with the international 
community.18 Interest in working with the international community persists and 
represents an on-going legacy within government.  
 
Receptivity 
 
These two conditions, reputation-building and historic legacies, set the 
stage for Brazil’s receptivity to donor aid assistance. Bilateral aid emerged early 
on. In 1992, the AIDS program received a bridge loan from the USAID to sustain 
its prevention activities while undergoing negotiations with the World Bank for 
its first loan.19 The USAID followed up with 5-6 year strategy grants to address 
HIV prevention among vulnerable groups, promote condom use and NGO 
support.20 In 1992, moreover, France’s ANRS (National AIDS Society for 
Research) provided funding to conduct HIV research. DFID also provided 
support during the 1980s, which was mainly focused on NGOs, and has 
continued to provide funding for prevention in the Amazons.21  
 Brazil was also open to multilateral assistance and philanthropy. As early 
as 1986, the government received funding from the WHO to construct the 
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national AIDS program.22 The Pan America Health Organization (PAHO) also 
provided financial and technical support during this period.23 And finally, the 
government received financial assistance from philanthropic organizations, such 
as the Ford Foundation, to support NGOs.24  
These early partnerships notwithstanding, the biggest contributor to the 
AIDS program was the World Bank. Since 1993 the government has been 
receptive to a series of loans from the Bank to expand AIDS administration, 
create more effective prevention programs while providing funding to NGOs.25 
An ongoing relationship with the World Bank has developed a partnership that 
persists, grounded in the tenants of simultaneously working closely with NGOs 
and donors.  
 Receptivity to donors also provided the opportunity space for the 
emergence of an ongoing partnership between donors, AIDS officials, and NGOs. 
Since the early 1990s, previously ignored AIDS officials engaged in a partnership 
with the World Bank to work with NGOs in order to strengthen the AIDS 
program.26 AIDS officials viewed working with the Bank and eventually other 
donors, such as USAID and the Global Fund, as a way to advance their careers.27 
Even though NGOs were essentially ignored during the first few years of the 
epidemic,28 working closely with NGOs after the World Bank loans arrived 
increased the influence of AIDS officials, since civic incorporation was advocated 
by the World Bank and President Itamar Franco and Fernando Cardoso. Over the 
years, AIDS officials have had incentives to sustain this tripartite partnership and 
to use it in order to increase their legitimacy and bargaining power when seeking 
more congressional funding.29 
  The presence of domestic institutions increasing the representation of 
civil society certainly facilitated the formation of a tripartite partnership; though 
by no means was this determining factor. In 1987, the National AIDS 
Commission within the AIDS program was created in order to solidify the 
representation of PLWHA and NGOs in the policy-making process. While the 
AIDS Program director did not immediately work closely with the Commission,30 
the latter did nevertheless facilitate the formation of a partnership between AIDS 
officials and NGOs throughout the 1990s.  
 
Resistance 
 
However, Brazil has not always been receptive to the international 
community. In 2003, for example, the Ministry of Health rejected a grant from 
the USAID for $40 million dollars in response to the conditionality that the 
government sign an oath condemning prostitution and that no assistance be 
provided to sex workers. The director of the AIDS program, Dr. Pedro Checquer, 
immediately rejected this on the grounds that it violated the government’s 
normative commitment to human rights and citizenship.31 In addition, in 1992 
the Ministry of Health vehemently opposed the World Bank’s mandate that it not 
finance the provision of ARV medication through its universal healthcare system. 
The Bank believed that doing this would essentially bankrupt the state, given the 
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dire fiscal conditions at the time. Once again, the AIDS program rejected this on 
the grounds that this advice violated the government’s normative commitment to 
ensuring equal access to medicine, a right enshrined through the 1988 
constitution.32 
 Perhaps Brazil’s most noteworthy example of its resistance to the 
international community has been its response to pharmaceutical markets. Brazil 
has shown resistance by strategically taking advantage of the 1995 TRIPS ruling, 
and subsequent 2001 Doha declaration. The Ministry of Health has periodically 
used this ruling as a bargaining chip when negotiating with pharmaceutical 
companies for price reductions.33 By periodically threatening to produce generic 
versions of patented medicine, Brazil has been able to acquire medicine at a more 
affordable price. For several years the government has used this threat to 
successfully reduce the prices of several patented drugs. Until May 2007, when 
the government issued its first compulsory license for the production of Merck’s 
Efavirenz, Brazil did not issue a compulsory license, mainly due to fears of the 
ramifications it would have for free trade with the US.34 
 This effort to resist markets has been guided by the government’s 
unwavering commitment to democracy and the belief that guaranteeing access to 
medicine is a human right.35 The 1988 constitution’s mandate for universal 
healthcare and equality solidified this belief. In this context, the government has 
perceived the imposition of high prices for ARV medication as a serious threat to 
its ability to maintain this democratic commitment.  
 Developing the infrastructural capacity needed to produce generic versions 
of ARV medication has also strengthened the government’s interest and ability to 
resist markets. By investing in government-run institutions such as Far-
Manguinhos in Rio, and other state-owned labs in São Paulo, the government has 
proven capable of developing the technology needed to produce generic drugs at 
a cheap price. In addition, the government’s historic commitment to creating a 
strong pharmaceutical industry, when combined with unwavering political will, 
has not only facilitated the production of medicine but has also provided a 
resource with which to use as an effective bargaining chip when negotiating 
prices with pharmaceutical companies: that is, its ability to increase its 
knowledge and awareness of the costs involved in producing medicine that is 
patented on the international market.36 With this knowledge, the Ministry of 
Health knows that it can use its infrastructural capacity to effectively bargain 
with pharmaceutical companies. Since 1994, it has done so successfully. 
 
INDIA 
 
Like Brazil, India also shares a rich history of working with the international 
community. While it did not join Brazil and China during the formation of the 
World Health Organization in 1948, it was the first in its region to participate in 
the creation of the South-East Asia regional office of the WHO in 1948.37 Since 
then, India has worked closely with the WHO to eradicate disease in South-East 
Asia.38 At the same time, it has worked closely with the WHO to eradicate 
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smallpox by working with health officials to strengthen India’s National Smallpox 
Eradication Program (NSEP).39 India viewed the WHO and other nations, such as 
Russia, as key partners in finding and distributing vaccines for smallpox 
eradication.40 
 In addition, the government has been concerned about its reputation. In 
recent years, it has strengthened the AIDS program and engaged in partnerships 
with donors in order to enhance its reputation.41 The government has not 
responded favorably towards criticism, such as the Gates foundation’s statement 
in 2001 that India would have 25 million cases of AIDS by 2010.42 Responding 
through an aggressive AIDS program has therefore been viewed as an important 
way to prove the international community wrong. As India strives to make its 
mark on the global sphere and enhance its regional influence, reputation-
building has motivated the Prime Minister and AIDS officials to work with the 
donor community to strengthen its response. 
In addition, institutional designs did not influence the Prime Minister’s 
engagement with the international community. After a long delay in the PM’s 
attention to AIDS, in 2001 PM Atal Vajpayee made proactive efforts to engage the 
international community and to increase the government’s commitment to AIDS. 
While he obtained parliamentary and bi-partisan support for his statements,43 
they were by no means the main reason for why he responded. Vajpayee and PM 
Manmohan Singh were essentially working on their own. 
 
Receptivity 
  
Nevertheless, the two dynamics mentioned earlier, i.e., reputation-
building and historic legacies, provided incentives for the government to work 
closely with the donor community. India’s partnership with donors began during 
the early-1990s. State governments received technical and financial assistance 
from bi-lateral agencies, such as USAID and DFID.  USAID was particularly 
instrumental in providing assistance to NGOs for AIDS prevention,44 and 
continues to do so.45 During the early-1990s, DFID also played a key role in 
providing the states with prevention and treatment services.46 Since 1999, DFID 
has provided funding to NACO and state governments. More recently, DFID has 
provided funding to the NACO in order to strengthen its intervention at the state-
level.47 
At the multi-lateral level, India entered into several early partnerships. In 
1985, the WHO provided support for AIDS research. In 1987, the WHO helped 
the government create the National AIDS Control Program for strategy and 
planning prevention.48 By 1989, the WHO started working with state 
governments to implement prevention policies.49 The WHO continues to provide 
support, mainly through surveillance and technical assistance.50  
In 1992, the World Bank also began to provide support. That year, the 
Bank provided a loan of $84 million, followed by yet another for $191 million in 
1999, with the government contributing $14 million from its budget. These 
projects were aimed at improving the blood supply, increasing awareness of HIV 
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transmission, and creating State AIDS Control Societies (SACS) to help 
implement prevention policies.51  
By 2002, the bulk of funding for NACO came from the World Bank, an 
estimated $38.2 million, followed by the government at $7.8 million and 
approximately $10 million from other bilateral donors.52 When compared to 
other more burdensome diseases, however, the government commits most of its 
resources to AIDS.53 
 Similar to Brazil, NACO officials and the PM continued to strengthen its 
partnership with the World Bank. In 2007, NACO approached the Bank for a 
Phase III credit of $250 million dollars.54 The goal of this project is to create a 
more comprehensive AIDS program, where NACO, SACS, and NGOs work 
together;55 this partnership persists. 
 Yet another multilateral agency that has provided assistance is the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria. Since 2004, the Global Fund has provided 
the Department of Economic Affairs with grants to help mothers with HIV, 
PLWHA, and ARV treatment.56 In addition, in 2004 the Global Fund provided 
the Department of Economic Affairs with a grant to address the TB-HIV co-
infection problem. Since 2004, several grants totaling US$ 505,653,939.00 have 
been provided.57  
 Private philanthropy has also been helpful. In 2002, the Bill & Melinda 
Gates foundation provided $258 million for the Avahan initiative. This is a HIV 
prevention program aimed at Indian truck drivers and the six highest prevalence 
states in India.58 And in 2006, the Clinton Foundation provided funding to help 
NACO work with nurses in small communities.59 
India’s continued partnership with the Global Fund, the World Bank and 
other donors seems to suggest that NACO officials are benefiting from an ongoing 
partnership. AIDS officials continue to be employed and advance within NACO as 
long as donor aid persists. In addition, NACO officials have increased their 
partnership with AIDS NGOs. This has occurred mainly between SACS, as they 
rely on NGOs to reach distance municipal districts.60 As SACS continue to face 
technical and administrative difficulties, the NACO has continued to rely on 
NGOs.61 
It is important to note, however, that donor aid assistance on its own has 
not been the key catalyst to government response, or to the subsequent formation 
of a tripartite partnership. Despite early donor assistance, the government did 
not begin to aggressively respond until 2001.62 Before then the states responded 
on their own, while the Ministry of Health and PM seemed to ignore the 
situation.63 While the recent arrival of funding from the Global Fund, the World 
Bank, and the Gates foundation has certainly helped, the government’s response 
was very much delayed. 
When it comes to working with NGOs, the government’s record has not 
been as stellar, though it is certainly improving.  The absence of institutions such 
as a national AIDS commission mandating the representation of NGOs has 
limited NACO’s ability to work closely with NGOs and to use them in order to 
increase NACO’s influence. Moreover, NACO’s commitment to working with 
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NGOs only recently emerged in 2003.64 A National AIDS Committee exists; but it 
was not explicitly designed to insure NGO representation. Some officials have 
stated that there has been a consistent lack of clarity and interest on the part of 
NACO and local government officials to incorporate NGOs into the policy-making 
process.65 There is now a stronger commitment to clearly delineate and increase 
NACO’s partnership with NGOs, as well as including them in the National 
Strategic Plan on AIDS.66 
 
Resistance 
 
While India has demonstrated receptivity to the international community, 
there have also been instances of resistance. Until recently, for example, it has 
gone against the international community’s endorsement of harm reduction.67 As 
part of NACO’s second phase response in 1992, it essentially avoided this issue by 
devolving this responsibility to the states.68 To this day, no federal harm 
reduction program exists, though recently NACO has considered developing such 
a program.69 Alternatively, when it comes to prevention, India has resisted 
international suggestions for increased sex education in schools.70 With the 
recent exception of some states, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Madhya 
Pradesh, sex education has not been allowed, nor has NACO sought to enforce it.  
When it comes to harm reduction, some attribute resistance to the fact 
that drug use is viewed as a social evil, and that the government does not want to 
condone such behavior.71 With regards to sex education, analysts attribute 
resistance to the government’s view that it encourages the immoral act of sexual 
promiscuity.72 Both impulses suggest that the government’s resistance is heavily 
influenced by deeply inculcated moral views. 
 When it comes to acquiring ARV medication, however, India has not 
shown as much resistance. This is particularly alarming considering the long 
history that India has of producing generic medication and distributing drugs 
throughout Asia.73 Since agreeing to join TRIPS in 1995, the government has not 
tried to issue threats of compulsory licensing. This mainly reflects the 
government’s fear of tainting its image of being a fair trade partner. The closest 
the government has come to resisting markets is to amend patent legislation in 
2005 indicating that only new drugs deemed to be “new and innovative” can be 
patented and sold in markets. India’s recent denial to recognize the patented 
drug Novartis for Leukemia in January 2006 suggests that the government may 
start doing the same for ARV mediation.74  
 Even more puzzling is the fact that India has a very strong domestic 
infrastructure for producing drugs.75 Pharmaceutical companies such as Cipla, 
Ranbaxy Laboratories, Matrix Laboratories, and Hetero drugs all produce ARV 
medicine at cheap and affordable prices. In the future, India could very well use 
these laboratories to its advantage by threatening to issue compulsory licenses.76 
India also has superb medical research institutions, such as the National AIDS 
Research Institute (NARI), and gifted scientists. Under these conditions, India 
may eventually be in a good position to guarantee and provide ARV mediation. 
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 Yet another differentiating factor between India and Brazil is the fact that 
the evolution of India’s national health insurance program was not born out of 
democratization processes. Efforts to provide a national based primary 
healthcare system originated shortly after India gained political independence in 
1947.77 The government’s provision of healthcare was driven mainly to ensure 
socioeconomic development. Later in 1983, through the creation of the National 
Health Policy, the government mandated the creation of a universal healthcare 
system. Since then, healthcare delivery has been the primary responsibility of 
states, though most of the funding comes from the center.78 
 In contrast to Brazil, the challenge is that because India’s universal 
healthcare system was not born out of democratization processes, there were no 
incessant pressures and expectations that the government provide universal 
healthcare. Consequently, when AIDS emerged, India’s political elites did not feel 
that it was their responsibility to ensure that all citizens have equal access to ARV 
medicine. Moreover, what this meant was that the pharmaceutical industry’s 
imposition of high prices was not perceived as threatening the government’s 
ability to maintain their normative democratic commitments. Consequently, the 
impulse to resist markets for the sake of democracy and human rights simply was 
not there. 
 
RUSSIA 
Russia shares with Brazil and India a rich history of working with the 
international community. While it was not an important player in the formation 
of the WHO, it did nevertheless work with other countries for the eradication of 
smallpox, syphilis, and Spanish flu. Russia’s historic expertise in epidemiological 
research and surveillance lent itself to the sharing of knowledge and partnership 
with other nations.79 While the focus in recent decades has been on strengthening 
state-level monitoring and response to disease, Russia’s Ministry of Health and 
Social Development has not been entirely isolated from the international 
community. 
 What distinguishes Russia from other nations is the fact that its political 
leadership was never concerned about its international reputation. Beginning 
with the Mikhail Gorbachev administration, the government initially ignored the 
epidemic and was isolated in its response.80 Even after the emergence of global 
pressures under the Boris Yeltsin administration, Yeltsin had no interest in 
increasing the government’s reputation and response. What is more, little was 
done at the domestic level. Moral stigma, discrimination towards gays, and a 
commitment to a decentralized response essentially thwarted any attempts at 
responding to AIDS.81 In recent years, President Vladimir Putin has been more 
committed to strengthening the AIDS program. Part of this comes in response to 
increased global pressures, especially for helping other nations finance responses 
to AIDS. Yet at no point has Putin been concerned about his reputation.  
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Receptivity 
 
Unlike Brazil and India, Russia has not been as committed to 
strengthening its partnerships with donors. In part this is a result of Russia’s 
apathy towards increasing its reputation and influence. Furthermore, the Yeltsin 
and Putin administrations were autonomous from domestic political pressures. 
At no point did the Congress, public, and private sector interests influence the 
presidents’ relationship with donors and domestic policy.82 Instead, the president 
and his health officials have responded to what they perceive to be genuine 
domestic health needs rather than international norms and expectations.83  
With regards to donor assistance, bi-lateral aid was the first to arrive. By 
1998, USAID provided Russia with several million in aid through their IMPACT 
program (Implementing AIDS Prevention and Care Project) to work with the 
Ministry of Health and NGOs on prevention policy.84 From 1998-2000, USAID 
also provided funding for HIV prevention among at-risk groups, while in 2005 
USAID worked in partnership with Population Services International to launch 
the PreventAIDS initiative; this works with the Russian government and NGOs to 
improve prevention services, increase awareness, and build capacity in reaching 
vulnerable populations.85  
In 1999, the first major multi-lateral aid package arrived. That year, the 
World Bank offered its first loan for AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), totaling US$150 
million, with $100 going to TB and $50 going to HIV/AIDS.86 After a long delay 
due to the Ministry of Health’s resistance in adhering to the WHO’s DOT 
standards, in 2003 the loan was finally provided.87 The Bank had a hard time 
trying to re-establish its ties with Russia; it took the lead in doing this, suggesting 
that the government was not as committed to engaging in a partnership.88  
In 2005, the European Union provided 4million Euros to help Russia 
strengthen its AIDS program, which is focused on drug procurement and 
capacity-building.89 Funding has also come from UNAIDS, WHO, UNESCO, 
UNDP, and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA).90 And in 
2005, the “Coordination in Action” initiative was initiated by DfID and SIDA, 
providing US$2 million dollars for a “3 ones” approach to AIDS control. 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria has also been an 
important contributor. Beginning in 2004, the Global Fund awarded a grant to 
the GLOBUS (a consortium of Russian and international NGOs) project in the 
amount of US$34.2 million to provide AIDS prevention and treatment services. 
In 2005, another grant in the amount of US$120 million was provided to help the 
Ministry of Health increase administrative and technical capacity and policy 
development.91 
In recent years, Russia has also obtained funding from private 
philanthropists. The George Soros foundation’s Open Society Institute (OSI), for 
example, has invested in harm reduction strategies and has funded several NGOs. 
The Ford Foundation has also given money to NGOs, such as the Russian Harm 
Reduction Network. And more recently, the Johnson & Johnson foundation, in 
partnership with the USAID, has worked with HealthRight International and 
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Doctors to Children, a Russian NGO, to fund projects providing prevention 
education to street children.92 
 Despite these multiple sources of donor aid assistance, it is important to 
note that these partnerships are very recent and difficult to maintain. Unlike 
Brazil and India, Russia does not have long-term experience working with the 
World Bank and other donors. In fact, and as noted earlier, the government 
initially resisted the Bank’s efforts to engage in a partnership for a loan in 1999, 
finally coming to fruition in 2003 due to the Bank’s persistence.  
Because this funding is so new, Russian AIDS officials have not had an 
opportunity to strengthen their ties with donors and establish a network of trust 
and support, as well as career notoriety and advancement. While new 
partnerships have been formed with the Global Fund and other donors, the 
government has been essentially forced to respond, due mainly to increased 
external pressure. The effective tripartite partnership that emerged in Brazil has 
not arisen in Russia. 
Indeed, since AIDS emerged in Russia the Ministry of Health has not been 
committed to working closely with NGOs. In a political context where the 
governing party has historically limited the participation of civic associations 
involved in policy, the formation of NGOs has been difficult to achieve.93 
Consequently, those NGOS that exist are weak and poorly organized. Moreover, 
the Ministry of Health did not form an institution guaranteeing the participation 
of NGOs until 2004, at which point the Coordinating Council on HIV/AIDS was 
formed.94 Even then, the Commission was powerless because high-level political 
party members were not present on the Commission.95 
 
Resistance 
 
Russia has also been quite resistant when it comes to international 
recommendations for AIDS treatment. This is especially the case when one looks 
at harm reduction policies. For years, the government has vehemently resisted 
international pressures, especially from the UN and international NGOs, such as 
the International Harm Reduction Association, to introduce harm reduction 
strategies.96 Russia, as well as the US and Japan, have incessantly ignored 
evidence showing that the usage of methadone and clean needle exchange can 
help reduce HIV transmission.97 This is especially problematic in Russia, where 
most of HIV transmission is due to IDU.  
Analysts attribute this resistance to the government’s conservative moral 
belief, where drug usage has been condemned for years.98 Several federal laws 
were also implemented during the 1980s based on these normative beliefs, laws 
that carried severe punishment.99 This is an institutional legacy and mindset that 
has hampered federal and state government interest and commitment to harm 
reduction. 
AIDS prevention through sex education has also confronted much 
resistance, notwithstanding international advocacy in favor of this.100 For 
decades state governments, as well as the Russian Orthodox Church, has opposed 
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sex education, especially as it pertains to AIDS.101 Similar to Russia’s position on 
harm reduction, scholars note that this response can be attributed to the 
government’s morally conservative outlook.102 Some note that a very strong 
political coalition led by the Russian Orthodox Church, the communist party and 
Pro-Life movement has successfully pressured the parliament not to approve sex 
education in schools.103  
The Russian government has not been as resistant to markets for ARV 
medication. Rather than wholly accepting market value, the President and 
Minister of Health and Social Welfare have engaged in price negotiations through 
the WHO.104 Russia has been able to demonstrate need and a fiscal incapacity to 
purchase drugs at regular prices. While the government committed 
approximately 70% percent of its total HIV/AIDS budget (totaling US $4 million) 
from the Ministry of Health in 2005 for the purchase of ARV mediation,105 it is 
still in need; this is especially the case at the obslast level, where most states are 
often insolvent and incapable of purchasing ARV medicine.  
Russia’s response to pharmaceutical markets has therefore not been as 
aggressive as Brazil’s. Russia has instead relied more on negotiations and an 
emphasis on demonstrating needs. It is not clear that the government is doing 
this out of fear of tarnishing its image as a nation committed to fair trade. This is 
mainly because of the fact that the government is not overly concerned about its 
international reputation.  
The absence of government resistance also has to do with the fact that the 
government is not committed to producing generic medication. While Russia and 
other nations have recently come together to sign an agreement stating that the 
generic production of ARV should be pursued,106 and while donors such as the 
Global Fund have suggested that Russia engage in this process,107 this has not 
been a priority for the government.108 This smacks of a genuine lack of interest in 
making sure that citizens have access to medicine. And this has occurred even 
when Russia has the medical expertise and infrastructure needed to produce 
generic drugs. This situation puts Russia at an extreme disadvantage when it 
comes to bargaining with pharmaceutical corporations.  
 In addition to the absence of sound infrastructural capacity, Russia’s 
universal healthcare system did not evolve hand in hand with the transition to 
democracy. For years Russia provided universal healthcare as an important 
component to its decentralized healthcare system.109 The quality and timeliness 
of healthcare services, in addition to federal funding for ARV medication, is still 
problematic.110 Yet political elites have never equated universal access to 
medicine as a democratic right, a norm that they are committed to. Consequently, 
the rise of pharmaceutical prices has never imposed a serious threat to political 
elites’ commitment to democracy and human rights, thus failing to prompt 
resistance. 
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CHINA 
 
China exhibits the most similarity to Brazil in its historic commitment to working 
with the international community. China and Brazil were two of the originating 
founders of the WHO.111 By the late-1950s, China worked with other countries to 
eradicate smallpox.112 During this period China also began to collaborate more 
with medical doctors from the West, as is evident through the rise of Western 
trained medical practitioners in China during this period. 
 To a certain extent this history of international collaboration influenced 
the government’s interest in maintaining its reputation. China’s leadership has 
always been sensitive to international pressures and criticisms of its response to 
disease. A good example of this is when the government, after increased 
criticisms of its weak health systems response to SARS, suddenly began to 
publicly declare its commitment to strengthening its response to AIDS.113 SARS 
revealed China’s weak public health system and motivated the government to 
heighten its attention to AIDS.114 Others view this period as the “key turning 
point” in government response.115 The arrival of a new government in November 
of 2002, which was also committed to AIDS, certainly helped.116 The 
embarrassment associated with SARS behooved the government to rejuvenate its 
reputation.117 While China has certainly achieved this in the global South as a 
nation challenging Western views, especially as it pertains to the UN Security 
Council,118 reputation-building has certainly been a challenge when it comes to 
public health.  
 China’s history of reputation-building is not as long-winded as Brazil’s, 
however. While it had a history of international collaboration and prestige, there 
was a long period of time when China was isolated from the international 
community. Several structural conditions account for this. During the 1950s and 
1960s, the government’s focus was on strengthening domestic pubic health 
infrastructure and economic development. Syphilis posed such a threat. Mao Ze 
Dong’s focus was therefore on his nation, not the international sphere.119 Mao 
created a strong public health system and established universal health care for 
all.120 In addition, the great famine incident forced the government to focus on 
development issues. It was not until 1979 that China once again became active in 
the WHO and its collaboration with other nations to eradicate disease.  
 Thus in contrast to Brazil, China does not have a long, uninterrupted 
history of working with the international community and consolidating its 
reputation. It has only been more recently that the government has been 
concerned about this process, mainly because of SARS.  
During the 1990s, China was not eager to engage the international 
community. Institutional designs facilitated this process. The Premier was 
autonomous from legislative and bureaucratic pressures when deciding to engage 
the international community. Notwithstanding an increased role in the ability of 
public health officials to provide policy ideas and recommendations, this was 
never the case under prior administrations.121 It was not until Hu Jintao’s 
emergence that the President paid more attention to human development.122 Yet, 
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during the early and arguably most crucial years of the AIDS epidemic, the 
Premier was focused more on domestic issues, not the international community. 
 
Receptivity 
 
Consequently, it has not been until recently that the government has been 
receptive to donor assistance to strengthen its AIDS program. China did not 
engage in partnerships with the donor community until the late-1990s. While bi-
lateral agencies such as DFID provided assistance during the early-1990s to help 
strengthen China’s health systems,123 loans for HIV prevention and treatment 
were not provided until 1999. That year, DFID provided L21million for HIV 
programs through its Health VIII Support (1999-2002) program.124 In 2000, 
DFID gave another L15 million for five years for the China-UK HIV/AIDS 
Prevention and Care Program, which aimed to provide replicable models of 
successful prevention and treatment program in several provinces. In 2002, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) provided $US 15 million to increase research 
for AIDS, while AusAID (Australian Agency for International Development) 
provided $A14 million to work with China’s CDC on increasing community-based 
intervention, build local government capacity, and increase the effectiveness of 
its public health system. 
When it came to multi-lateral aid, in 1999 the World Bank gave China $4.5 
million for prevention programs in the Xinjiang province, followed by $25 
million for prevention in Fiujan, Shanxi, Guangxi, and Xianji through the Health 
IX HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Program.125 Multi-lateral assistance increased 
substantially after 2003.126 That year, the Global Fund provided a grant to 
finance new equipment for China’s CARE programs, as well as funding for health 
worker training, HIV prevention, and condom usage. In 2004, the Global Fund 
provided an additional grant to target IDUs in 7 provinces.  
China has also benefited from philanthropy. Since the early-1990s, the 
Ford foundation provided support to NGOs working on prevention.127 More 
recently, the Clinton foundation has provided US$10 million for pediatric 
services for children suffering from AIDS. Merk and Bayer pharmaceutical 
corporations have also provided funding for treatment and prevention services.  
Despite this assistance, it is important to note that these aid packages are 
new and did not provide enough time for China’s AIDS officials to cultivate a 
close partnership with donors. Again, DFID’s presence during the 1990s was 
focused on health systems and access to medicine, not AIDS. Donor assistance 
for AIDS did not emerge until 1999. Even then, funding was not provided for 
China’s AIDS program but rather for provincial governments.  
While a long-term partnership with donors is important for a successful 
tripartite partnership to emerge, equally if not more important is the 
government’s commitment to NGOs. The upshot is that the government has not 
been committed to facilitating the incorporation of NGOs into the policy-making 
process. While the government, and especially the CDC (Chinese Center for 
Disease Control), has certainly gained an appreciation for the work of AIDS 
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NGOs, the Ministry of Health has not consolidated its partnership with them.128 
Furthermore, and in contrast to Brazil, there is no committee in the National 
Center for AIDS Prevention and Control (NCAIDS) formally incorporating NGOS 
into the policy-making process.  
Two factors account for this lack of institutionalization. First, most of the 
AIDS NGOs working in China are GONGO’s (Government Organized Non-
Governmental Organizations).129 Second, there is still a high degree of distrust 
among local government officials towards NGOs. While state-level CDC officials 
have been keen on using NGOs for reaching at-risk groups, local government 
officials still view NGOs as potentially revolutionary. This has limited AIDS NGO 
partnerships with local officials.130  
 These constraints have motivated new non-governmental AIDS NGOs to 
emerge and seek ways of increasing their influence. As we saw with Brazil during 
the 1990s prior to the World Bank loan, beginning in 2002 non-governmental 
AIDS NGOs in China started to mobilize in response to the arrival of funding 
from the Global Fund.131 The Global Fund’s mandate to increase the 
representation of NGOs and PLWAS in Country Coordinating Mechanisms 
(CCMs), in addition to the alleged failure of elections for civic members of the 
CCM in 2003, has prompted the Global Fund and UNAIDS to pressure the 
government to institutionalize civic participation and strengthen its relationships 
with NGOs.132 Though essentially forced to change its tone with civil society, the 
government is now much more open and committed to working with NGOs and 
the Global Fund. 
 
Resistance 
 
When it comes to international recommendations for prevention and 
treatment policy, China has not been as receptive. For years the government did 
not endorse harm reduction strategies, notwithstanding international 
recommendations for doing so.133 It has only been recently that the Ministry of 
Health has condoned the usage of harm reduction strategies.134 Some claim that 
the government initially resisted these measures because of the historic moral 
campaign against drug use.135 During the 1950s, drug use was seen as a social evil 
and not to be encouraged; this normative legacy carried over to the 1980s, when 
drug use started to become more frequent. While the Ministry of Health and state 
governments have now become, at least in theory, more liberally minded and 
willing to use harm reduction, and while some states have experimented with 
clean needle exchange and methadone, some analysts claim that normative views 
and stigma still hamper the implementation of policy.136 
 Similar resistance has emerged when it comes to sex education. Despite 
international recommendations,137 for years the government did not approve sex 
education in schools, especially with regards to HIV. Once again, this resistance 
stemmed from deeply ingrained moral and conservative views seeing as a social 
taboo premarital sex and prostitution.138 In recent years, the government has 
relaxed its moral impulse. Earlier this year, the government launched a sex 
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education awareness campaign to address HIV and other sexually transmitted 
diseases.139 The government is now promoting commercials on safe sex.140 Thus, 
in contrast to India and Russia, the historical institutional legacy of morality and 
conservativism has not generated as much resistance to international 
recommendations.   
In addition, China’s resistance of global markets for ARV medication has 
not been as austere as Brazil’s. China has not issued compulsory licenses for ARV, 
despite the fact that it is a world leader in the production of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients and second line drugs.141 Nor has the government 
threatened to issue them. This derives mainly from the fear that the government 
has of violating TRIPS agreements and US patent laws.142 Officials fear that 
issuing compulsory licenses may have long term ramifications, such as generating 
few incentives for corporations to engage in drug experimentation, failure to 
improve the overall quality of drug products, while threatening the prospect of 
continued foreign direct investment.143 Instead, the government has engaged in 
price negotiations with pharmaceutical companies.144  
 Because China only produces seven of the over twenty necessary ARV 
medications, some have suggested that the government issue compulsory licenses 
to produce the rest.145 The number of HIV positive in need of access to medicine 
has increased, while the actual provision and affordability of medicine has 
declined.146 China has the infrastructural capacity needed to start producing the 
remaining medication. But the government has found it more advantageous, both 
economically and geopolitically, to engage in price negotiations.147 It therefore 
seems that the government prioritizes securing foreign direct investment rather 
than ensuring that its citizens have access to medicine. 
 One reason accounting for this kind of response has to do with the fact 
that the imposition of high prices for ARV medication does not threaten the 
government’s commitment to providing medication for its citizens. First of all, 
China does not have a free universal healthcare system. Citizens must pay fees for 
health services, while the government has repeatedly fallen short of funding all 
aspects of its public health system. Second, although the state provided universal 
healthcare in the past, and while it continues to provide some medical care for 
free, state health care never emerged in tandem with democratization processes. 
The state never viewed universal healthcare as a universal right, guaranteed 
through political opening and institutions. Thus, when high prices for ARV 
medication arose, state elites did not feel threatened in their ability to maintain 
their commitments to society. 
 The Chinese government did nevertheless eventually agree to start 
providing ARV medication for free to poor citizens in rural parts of China. From 
2001 to 2003, through the government’s CARES (China Comprehensive AIDS 
Response) initiative, the state allocated 100 million Yuan ($112 million) per year 
to pay for this service. However, scholars note that this amount is far from 
sufficient in providing what is needed to cover all HIV infected.148 The provision 
of a grant in 2005 for $98 million from the Global Fund to pay for the 
importation of patent medicine may help the government address this issue. 
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While this may help alleviate short term needs, in the future the government will 
need to commit more domestic resources to the production and provision of ARV 
medicine. 
 
CONCLUSION 
After several years of responding to the AIDS epidemic, emerging nations have 
become strategic in their interaction with the international community. I have 
put forth the theory that those nations concerned about their reputation and that 
have a long history of working with the international community will be 
continuously receptive to donor aid assistance in order to strengthen their AIDS 
programs. At the same time, however, they will resist international 
recommendations for prevention and treatment policy whenever the latter 
threatens domestic normative structures, such as morals and normative beliefs 
about universal healthcare, and when this combines with the pharmaceutical 
capacity needed to produce ARV medication. All of this is done in order to 
strategically use the international community for strengthening domestic 
programs. 
Of the four case studies examined in this article, Brazil stands out as the 
most strategic. Reputation-building and historic legacies of cooperation have led 
to an ongoing tripartite partnership between AIDS officials, donors, and NGOs, 
in turn providing AIDS officials with the leverage needed to further expand its 
AIDS program; this has engendered a program that continues to grow and 
outpace its counterparts in domestic spending – see Figure 1.1. Of the cases 
compared to Brazil, India came closest in developing a tripartite partnership, 
though it is new and not yet firmly established. 
But what is the deeper meaning underlying this strategic interaction? In 
essence, it is a reflection of an emerging nations’ growing sovereignty. That is, by 
engaging in strategic behavior, nations have the opportunity to show the world 
that they are developing the resources, capacity, and experience needed to 
respond to AIDS on their own; they want to reinforce the fact that they are no 
longer dependent on donor assistance and prescriptions of prevention and 
treatment policy; they, in short, want to show that they are important sovereign 
players, capable of controlling their own problems. 
Strategic interactions also provide an opportunity for emerging nations to 
eventually become leaders in the plight against AIDS. By developing unique, 
contextually-specific AIDS programs through their strategic usage of the 
international community, emerging nations can become models for other 
nations. For example, because Brazil’s tripartite partnership and resistance to 
countervailing policy prescriptions has led to a massive expansion of its AIDS 
program, and because of the high degree of notoriety it has received, Brazil has 
used its reputation in order to help other nations combat AIDS through the 
construction of pharmaceutical labs and technology. Through this assistance, 
Brazil is also striving to shape international policy, specifically donor 
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commitments to Africa and Asia. As India, China, and Russia gradually build 
their tripartite partnerships, they may also join Brazil in these broader endeavors. 
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Figure 1.1 - Domestic Spending for National 
AIDS Programs in Brazil, Russia, and India
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And finally, the breadth of my argument has the potential of going beyond 
B.R.I.C. I have limited the scope of my analysis to these countries mainly because 
of the history of each nation’s engagement with the international community, 
their similar federal structures, economies, and growing influence in 
international politics. Keep in mind, however, that other emerging nations do not 
have this history of international cooperation, and thus the one element of 
receptivity that was important in Brazil, historic legacy in international 
cooperation, is absent.  
In South Africa, for example, the application of my framework reveals a 
nation that has been isolated from the international community, one that is 
apathetic about asserting its independence and increasing its international 
influence. Early receptivity to donor aid assistance was never present, which in 
turn reflected elite disinterest in the AIDS crisis.149 There was also a considerable 
amount of resistance to international recommendations for treatment policy. The 
presence of a relatively strong pharmaceutical sector,150 when combined with the 
government’s normative committed to universal healthcare,151 led to the issuance 
of a compulsory license in 2003.152 When it comes to prevention policy, it has not 
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resisted international recommendations; this is because stigma is not derived 
from morality but rather ethnic conflict and discrimination.153 In the absence of 
strategic interaction, and in sharp contrast to Brazil, however, the AIDS program 
has not been very effective. 
In Uganda, on the other hand, receptivity to donor aid assistance did occur 
early on, due mainly to government concern about its reputation.154 Ongoing 
partnerships with donors and NGOs have led to a persistent increase in AIDS 
program expansion and effectiveness. Conversely, the absence of a strong 
pharmaceutical sector,155 the absence of a universal healthcare system, and the 
fear that issuing compulsory licenses may have on the nation’s trade status has 
not generated incentives to resist pharmaceutical markets. The absence of moral 
constraints, too, has not led to resistance towards international 
recommendations for sex education or harm reduction. Thus, Uganda exhibits a 
case where it takes resources from the international community while shying 
away from policy resistance. While the government has expanded its domestic 
programs through this interaction, it remains dependent on donor assistance and 
has not asserted its independence and influence. 
And finally, Thailand exhibits the most similar case to Brazil. While 
Thailand’s leadership was concerned about its reputation after 1991, it did not 
have a long history of working with other nations. Nevertheless, in order to 
sustain its reputation, it has worked closely with donors;156 by doing the same 
with NGOs, moreover, a tripartite partnership has formed, which in turn has led 
to the continued expansion of its AIDS program. Thailand’s strong political 
commitment to universal healthcare, as a normative democratic commitment, 
when combined with the presence of an effective pharmaceutical infrastructure, 
has created resistance to pharmaceutical markets, as evident through the 
imposition of compulsory licenses in 2007.157 And finally, Thailand has resisted 
recommendations for harm reduction, as this goes against the government’s 
moral views. Notwithstanding, the government has refrained from letting 
morality influence its unwavering commitment to sex education and condom 
use.158 Receptivity and resistance suggests that Thailand is strategically using the 
international community for an expansion of its AIDS program. Moreover, and 
similar to Brazil, it is using its success to help other nations combat AIDS, thus 
enhancing its international influence while solidifying its reputation as an 
emerging nation.159 
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